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NIMASA’s crusade to end war risk insurance will save Nigeria over $400 billion premium paid annually 

By Osagie Edward.

War risk insurance (WRI) is an additional surcharge imposed by international shipping companies on cargo bound for Nigeria.
 It comprises two key components: war risk liability, which covers people and goods aboard the vessel and is calculated based on the indemnity amount, and war risk hull, which covers the vessel itself and is determined by its value.
This financial burden was initially introduced during the height of Niger Delta militancy and piracy.
Although the Nigerian Bureau of Statistics does not have precise data on the total WRI payments made to international insurers, available figures indicate that Nigeria has paid over $1.5 billion in the past three years alone to Lloyd’s of London, Protection and Indemnity (P&I) insurance, and other foreign insurance firms.
The impact on Nigeria’s economy is staggering: for a Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC) valued at $130 million, the WRI surcharge per voyage is approximately $445,000.
 For new container vessels valued at $150 million, the cost rises to $525,000 per voyage.
Maersk, one of the world’s largest shipping companies, has also introduced a transit disruption surcharge of up to $450 per container, while other shipping lines impose a war risk surcharge of $40–$50 per 20-foot container.

Recognizing the severe economic implications of this financial burden, the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA) under the leadership of Dr. Dayo Mobereola has launched an aggressive campaign to eliminate war risk insurance on Nigeria-bound cargo.

The NIMASA Act and the Merchant Shipping Act mandate the agency to promote shipping development, and removing the WRI premium has become a central focus of its maritime reforms.
 The security concerns that originally justified these premiums no longer exist.
 Nigeria has not recorded a single piracy incident in over three years, and in 2021, the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) officially removed Nigeria from its list of piracy-prone countries.
Over the past five years, NIMASA, in collaboration with the Nigerian Navy, has led an unprecedented crackdown on piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, earning global recognition from the International Maritime Organization (IMO).
Despite these achievements, international shipping companies have continued to impose war risk insurance premiums on Nigeria-bound cargoes.
In 2023, the International Bargaining Forum (IBF) further validated Nigeria’s progress by delisting the country from the list of high-risk maritime nations.
 With piracy no longer a concern, why has the international shipping community continued to impose these excessive premiums?

NIGERIA’S EFFORTS TO MITIGATE WRI PREMIUMS

To address this issue, Nigeria through the Ministry of Marine and Blue Economy and the Ministry of Defense made significant investments in maritime security through initiatives like the Deep Blue Project, which has successfully eliminated piracy in the country’s waters for over 30 consecutive months—a record unmatched anywhere in the world.
 In addition, Nigeria collaborates closely with the IMO and other international bodies to combat maritime threats, further reducing its risk classification.
 IMO Secretary-General, Arsenio Dominguez, has publicly commended Nigeria’s efforts in securing the Gulf of Guinea.
Despite these improvements, shipowners and insurers have refused to acknowledge Nigeria’s new security status, continuing to levy exorbitant premiums on vessels operating in the country.

MOBEREOLA’S INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY: BRINGING GLOBAL ATTENTION TO THE ISSUE

Determined to break this cycle of financial exploitation, Dr. Mobereola under the directives of the Minister of Marine and Blue Economy, Adegboyega Oyetola, took Nigeria’s case to international stakeholders, urging them to support the removal of war risk insurance premiums.
In a major diplomatic move, he engaged Chatham House, where he met with Dr. Alex Vines, Director of the Africa Programme, who agreed to escalate the matter to the United Nations.
 NIMASA has also engaged major global shipping organizations, including: • BIMCO (Baltic and International Maritime Council), the world’s largest shipping association. • The International Chamber of Shipping (ICS). • INTERCARGO (International Association of Dry Cargo Shipowners). • INTERTANKO (International Association of Independent Tanker Owners).
In discussions with these organizations, Dr. Mobereola emphasized that Nigeria has invested billions in maritime security, yet continues to be unfairly penalized.
He urged the global shipping community to recognize the country’s improved security status and remove the unjustified WRI premiums.

Stinne Taiger Ivø, Deputy Secretary General of BIMCO, acknowledged Nigeria’s progress and stated that shipowners should take the lead in pushing for lower premiums.

Similarly, Zhou Xianyong of INTERCARGO assured NIMASA of their support in Nigeria’s campaign to be delisted from war risk insurance premium zones.
 Reducing these premiums is critical for Nigeria’s competitiveness in global trade.
 Lower shipping costs will encourage more international trade, attract foreign investment, and strengthen Nigeria’s position as a leading blue economy player.

Recently, NIMASA met with a Danish delegation led by Kristin Skov-Spilling, Chief Technical Advisor from the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, urging Denmark to advocate for a reduction in war risk insurance premiums.

Some critics argue that Denmark cannot intervene in private insurance matters, but this argument is flawed.
Denmark has a significant interest in Maersk Line, which contributes over 15% of the country’s GDP.
If Denmark exerts pressure on Maersk, other shipping companies will likely follow suit.
Dr. Dayo Mobereola and his Management team at NIMASA have successfully brought global attention to Nigeria’s unfair war risk insurance burden.
 Now, it is time for all stakeholders—government, industry, and international bodies—to support the removal of this unjustified premium.
Nigeria has fulfilled its obligations, securing its waters and eliminating piracy.
 Yet, foreign insurance firms continue to profit while Nigerian businesses and consumers bear the costs.
The message is clear: Nigeria cannot continue paying war risk insurance premiums indefinitely.
The time for change is now and lets sustain the momentum.
OSAGIE EDWARD, FNIPR is the Head of Public Relations at the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency, (NIMASA)

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Customs

How Afeni is repositioning Idiroko trans- border trade route for economic prosperity, smugglers nightmare

Funso OLOJO, Editor 

For decades, the Idiroko border corridor has existed at the intersection of legitimate commerce and the informal economy, serving simultaneously as a gateway for legitimate trans-border trade and a lucrative passage for smugglers exploiting Nigeria’s long and porous western frontier.

But that business environment appears to be undergoing a gradual transformation.

At the centre of the emerging change is the Ogun I Area Command of the Nigeria Customs Service, where the Acting Customs Area Controller, Deputy Comptroller Olukayode Afeni, has adopted a more aggressive intelligence-led enforcement strategy aimed at altering the risk-reward equation that has historically sustained illicit commerce along the corridor.

Afeni’s philosophy is relatively straightforward: legitimate trade should be facilitated, but smuggling, drug trafficking and other forms of economic sabotage must become increasingly difficult, expensive and dangerous.

The latest operational scorecard presented by the Command on Thursday, August 13th, 2026 provides an insight into the scale of that campaign.

The Command paraded seizures with a combined Duty Paid Value of N3.574 billion, covering agricultural products, petroleum products, textiles, consumer goods and narcotics.

Among the intercepted items were 2,339 bags of foreign parboiled rice, 70 cartons of basmati rice, 6,035 parcels of Ghana Loud/Indica, 30 bags of foreign sugar, 11,450 litres of PMS in kegs, 1,750 litres of PMS in drums, 30 kegs of diesel, 100 bags of fertilizer and 67 bales of second-hand clothing.

The seizure list also included thousands of pieces of new clothing, drinks, cosmetics, hair accessories, fire extinguishers, purses and other consumer products.

But the significance of the figures does not lie merely in their monetary value. They provide an indication of the variety of commercial activities that the Command is now confronting along the border—and of the extent to which enforcement is beginning to influence the operating environment for both legitimate traders and illicit networks.

The Idiroko corridor has never been simply a Customs enforcement zone. It is a commercial ecosystem connecting communities and businesses on both sides of the Nigeria-Benin frontier.

For legitimate traders, the border provides access to markets, goods and opportunities for cross-border commerce.

For smugglers, however, the same geography presents opportunities to bypass formal import procedures and exploit differences in prices, taxes, restrictions and market demand between the two countries.
That is where Afeni’s intervention becomes significant.

Rather than viewing seizures as isolated enforcement events, the current strategy increasingly appears designed to disrupt the underlying business model of smuggling.

Every intercepted truck, vehicle, petroleum consignment, rice shipment or narcotics parcel represents not only a seizure but a potential interruption of a supply chain.

The objective is to make illegal trade less predictable and less profitable.

Rice and the economics of local production

Foreign parboiled rice remains one of the most visible commodities in the border enforcement equation.

The interception of more than 2,300 bags in the latest operation reinforces the persistent pressure on domestic rice production from illicit imports.

Afeni’s argument is that smuggling should be viewed through the prism of economic protection rather than merely customs prohibition.

When imported rice enters Nigeria outside the approved channels, it competes directly with Nigerian farmers, millers and distributors without necessarily bearing the same regulatory and fiscal obligations.

For a government attempting to strengthen domestic agricultural production, such competition can undermine investment and discourage farmers from expanding production.

The Ogun I campaign therefore places border enforcement within the broader question of Nigeria’s food-security strategy.
In Afeni’s formulation, protecting the border is also protecting the farmer.

The narcotics economy

If rice represents the agricultural dimension of the border challenge, narcotics represent its darker security dimension.

The Command’s interception of 6,035 parcels of Ghana Loud/Indica in the latest operation is significant, but the larger figure disclosed by Afeni is even more revealing.

From January to date, he said, Ogun I has handed over 32,412 parcels of hard drugs and 92 sacks of raw Cannabis sativa to the NDLEA Idiroko Special Command.

That figure places narcotics enforcement firmly among the Command’s major operational priorities.

It also demonstrates why border security increasingly requires agencies to work beyond traditional institutional boundaries.

Customs officers may intercept the shipment, but the investigation, drug intelligence and prosecution process require the specialised capabilities of the NDLEA and other security agencies.

The formal handover of the seized narcotics during Thursday’s event therefore symbolised the growing importance of inter-agency collaboration in securing the corridor.

The border as an export gateway

Perhaps one of the less discussed aspects of the Ogun I story is the Command’s export performance.

While considerable attention is naturally attracted by seizures, the Command also recorded 10,110 metric tonnes of exports, with a Free On Board value of N2.594 billion.
White talc, crushed thermal coal and CNG were identified as the principal drivers of the export volume.

That statistic is important because it challenges the perception of Idiroko principally as a route for imported goods.
The corridor is also capable of serving as a platform for Nigerian exports.

This creates a potentially important policy distinction. The objective of effective border management should not be to suppress cross-border commerce; rather, it should be to differentiate legitimate commerce from illicit trade and create an environment where compliant businesses can operate with greater certainty.

For Customs, that means enforcement and trade facilitation must move together.

Revenue from the corridor

The Command’s fiscal contribution also offers another measure of its economic relevance.
In July alone, Ogun I collected N90.066 million from baggage assessments, auctions of perishable items, PMS and other charges.

Although the figure is modest when compared with the revenue generated by Nigeria’s major seaport commands, it illustrates the multiple revenue streams available within the border environment.

More importantly, it demonstrates that the border economy extends beyond the conventional importation of goods.

A new risk calculation for smugglers

The central question surrounding Afeni’s tenure may therefore not be how many seizures the Command records in a particular month.

It may be whether the enforcement campaign is succeeding in changing the underlying calculation made by those who contemplate using the Idiroko corridor for illegal trade.

For years, smuggling has survived because its potential returns could outweigh the risks of interception.

That equation changes when intelligence improves, surveillance becomes more effective, inter-agency coordination becomes stronger and seized goods are followed by investigation and prosecution.

Afeni’s repeated warning that the Command intends to make Ogun I “hostile” to smugglers is therefore more than rhetoric.

It represents an attempt to change the commercial environment in which illicit operators make their decisions.
But legitimate trade must remain protected

There is, however, another side to the equation. Idiroko’s importance cannot be measured only by the volume of contraband intercepted.

Thousands of Nigerians depend on legitimate cross-border commercial activity, while manufacturers, exporters, transporters, farmers and traders require an efficient and predictable border environment.

This makes Afeni’s appeal to the media to distinguish legitimate trade from illicit activity particularly important.

An aggressive enforcement regime that succeeds in deterring smuggling but inadvertently discourages legitimate commerce would produce an incomplete outcome.

The real measure of success would be a corridor where legitimate traders face greater certainty while smugglers face greater uncertainty.

That distinction will be critical to the long-term economic impact of the current enforcement drive.

From border enforcement to economic protection

Afeni’s presentation ultimately places the Ogun I Command at the intersection of three major national priorities: security, economic protection and trade facilitation.

The seizure of foreign rice speaks to agricultural protection.
The interception of narcotics speaks to public safety and national security.

The export figures point towards the untapped commercial potential of the corridor.
The revenue figures demonstrate its fiscal relevance.

Taken together, the figures suggest that what is happening at Ogun I is bigger than a succession of seizure announcements.
It is a contest over the character of the Idiroko border economy itself.

Whether the emerging model can permanently shift the corridor from an environment where illicit commerce flourishes to one where legitimate trans-border trade becomes the dominant business model will depend on the sustainability of enforcement, the efficiency of Customs procedures, infrastructure, inter-agency cooperation and the willingness of border communities to support lawful commerce.

For now, however, Afeni appears determined to push the equation in one direction.
Make legitimate trade easier to identify and protect—and make smuggling increasingly difficult to sustain.

That could ultimately prove to be the most consequential change taking place along the Idiroko corridor.

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Features

Beyond Lagos ports: Why NPA should position Eastern ports for global recognition

Chief Nasiru Ibrahim

Monday Discourse with Ibrahim Nasiru focuses on why government should look beyond Lagos ports and position Eastern ports for global recognition.

Our feature last week on the World Bank Top 20 ranking for Tin Can and Apapa Ports sparked an intense industry debate.

The biggest question raised: What about the rest of Nigeria’s coastlines?

Dropping tomorrow morning, June 29th, 2026,we go beyond the Lagos headlines to break down the hidden operational realities of Nigeria’s Eastern Ports.

Don’t miss “Beyond Lagos: The Untold Realities of Nigeria’s Eastern Corridor Seaports”

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Economy

Nigeria’s Oil exports face threat as US- Israel attack on Iran escalates, Strait of Hormuz blockade imminent

Funso OLOJO, with agency report.
On Saturday, February 28th, 2026, the whole world woke to the shocking news of the death of the the Supreme leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khomenei, in a surprise attack launched by the joint forces of the United States of America(USA) and the State of Israel.
Apart from the killing of Khomenei,  key figures on the Iranian military top hierarchy, were also assassinated, leaving the Iranian military command decapitated.
The attack and the killing of its Supreme leader has been met with swift relatiatory attacks by Iran on Israel and the military bases of the US in the Gulf States of Oman, Saudi- Arabian, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Jordan.
However, the attack have begun to have spiral effects on the world economy as the Houthis, a fundamentalist group in the Middle East with sympathy for the Iranian cause, has threatened to attack vessels in the Strait of Hormuz.
About 20-30 percent of global oil and gas supplies are shipped through the Strait of Hormuz.
Where is the Strait of Hormuz?
The Strait of Hormuz is located between Oman and the UAE on one side and Iran on the other.

It links the Arabian/Persian Gulf, or just the Gulf, with the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea beyond.

It is 33km (21 miles) wide at its narrowest point, with the shipping lane just 3km (2 miles) wide in either direction, making it vulnerable to attack.

Despite its narrow width, the channel accommodates the world’s largest crude carriers.

Major oil and gas exporters in the Middle East rely on it to move supplies to international markets, while importing nations depend on its uninterrupted operation.
How much oil and gas pass through the strait?

According to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), about 20 million barrels of oil, worth about $500bn in annual global energy trade, transited through the Strait of Hormuz each day in 2024.The crude oil passing through the strait originates from Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

The strait also plays a critical role in the liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade.

 According to the EIA, in 2024, roughly a fifth of global LNG shipments moved through the corridor, with Qatar accounting for the vast majority of those volumes.
Analysts warned of a spike in global oil prices after Iranian officials hinted at shutting down the Strait of Hormuz, one of the most important maritime routes in the world.

On Saturday, February 28th, 2026, an official from the European Union told the Reuters news agency that vessels crossing the strait have been receiving very high frequency (VHF) transmissions from Iran’s elite Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), saying “no ship is allowed to pass the Strait of Hormuz”.However, the EU official added, Iran has not officially closed the strait.

Instead, several tanker owners have suspended oil and gas shipments through the strait amid the ongoing conflict in the region.

“Our ships will stay put for several days,” a top executive at a major trading desk told Reuters on condition of anonymity. Countries like Greece have also advised their vessels to avoid transiting through the waterway.

Any instability in this important maritime route could rattle economic stability worldwide.

Implications on Nigeria of disruption of ship movement in the Strait of Hormuz.
Nigeria’s economy is basically dependent on its crude oil. It account for more than 80 percent of its revenue earnings through export sales and the funding of its annual budget is significantly based on the oil sale receipts.
Disruptions in the movement of vessels in the Strait of Hormuz will therefore have a major adverse effect on its economy and this will affect the sales of its crude oil to its customers in Europe, Asia and Middle East.
Also, the development may disrupt the relative stability in the domestic prices of petroleum products as the blockage of the Strait of Hormuz may escalate the prices of crude oil in the international market.
As of 2024–2025, the primary net importers (top destinations) of Nigeria’s crude oil are Spain, the United States, India, France, and the Netherlands.
These countries consistently import large volumes of Nigerian crude, with the US increasing its reliance on Nigerian supplies to over 50% of its African imports in 2025.
Key details regarding Nigeria’s crude oil export destinations:

Top Importers: Spain, India, and the United States are the top consistent importers of Nigerian crude.

European Partners: France and the Netherlands are major European consumers of Nigeria’s oil.

Key Growth Markets: India and Italy have shown significant growth as importers between 2023 and 2024.

Other Importers: Other notable importers include Indonesia, Canada, Ivory Coast, and the United Kingdom.

United States Reliance: The U.S. remains a major partner, with Nigeria supplying 46.618 million barrels of crude in 2025.

In 2024, Nigeria’s crude oil exports totaled roughly $40.5 billion, cementing its status as a top-10 global exporter.
So what is the Strait of Hormuz, and how will its closure impact oil prices?

The strait handles both oil and gas exports and imports.

Kuwait and the UAE import supplies sourced outside the Gulf, including shipments from the United States and West Africa.

The EIA estimated that in 2024, 84 percent of crude oil and condensate shipments transiting the strait headed to Asian markets.

A similar pattern appears in the gas trade, with 83 percent of LNG volumes moving through the Strait of Hormuz destined for Asian destinations.

China, India, Japan and South Korea accounted for a combined 69 percent intake of all crude oil and condensate flows through the strait last year. Their factories, transport networks and power grids depend on uninterrupted Gulf energy.

A spike in oil prices will impact countries such as China, India and several Southeast Asian nations.

How would the Strait’s closure impact oil prices?

According to Iranian state media, the country’s Supreme National Security Council must make the final decision to close the strait, and it has to be ratified by the government.But energy traders have been on high alert in recent weeks amid escalating tensions in the region – home to one of the largest reserves of oil and gas in the world.

Muyu Xu, senior crude oil analyst at Kpler, told reporters that since the war began on Saturday, there has been a sharp drop in vessel traffic through the strait.

“At the same time, the number of vessels idling on either side – in the Gulf of Oman and the Gulf – has surged, as shipowners grow increasingly concerned about maritime security risks following Tehran’s warning of a potential navigation closure,” he said.

“The Strait of Hormuz is critical to the global energy market, as roughly 30 percent of the world’s seaborne crude oil transits the waterway.

” In addition, nearly 20 percent of global jet fuel and about 16 percent of gasoline and naphtha flows also pass through the Strait,” Muyu said.

“On Sunday, March 1st, 2026, an oil tanker was struck off the coast of Oman, signalling a clear escalation of the conflict and a shift in targets from purely military facilities to energy assets.”

Shipping data showed that at least 150 tankers, including crude oil and liquefied natural gas vessels, have dropped anchor in open Gulf waters beyond the Strait of Hormuz.

The tankers were clustered in open waters off the coasts of major Gulf oil producers, including Iraq and Saudi Arabia, as well as LNG giant Qatar, according to the Reuters news agency estimates based on ship-tracking data from the MarineTraffic platform.

Moreover, on Sunday, March 1st, 2026,the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) said it is aware of “significant military activity” in the Strait and said it has ⁠received a report of an ⁠incident two nautical miles north of Oman’s Kumzar, located in the ‌Strait of Hormuz.

Muyu from Kpler said a broad range of energy infrastructure is now under threat. “This is expected to sharply intensify the oil price rally and could keep prices elevated for a sustained period, potentially longer than during last June’s conflict.”

Ali Vaez, director of the Iran project at the International Crisis Group, told Al Jazeera, “Closure of the Strait of Hormuz would disrupt roughly a fifth of globally traded oil overnight – and prices wouldn’t just spike, they would gap violently upward on fear alone.”

“The shock would reverberate far beyond energy markets, tightening financial conditions, fuelling inflation, and pushing fragile economies closer to recession in a matter of weeks,” he added.

When the US and Israel bombed Iran last June, there was no direct disruption to maritime activity in the region.

What does it mean for the global economy?

Any disruption to energy flows through Hormuz will also impact the global economy, driving up fuel and factory costs.Hamad Hussain, a climate and commodities economist at the United Kingdom-based firm Capital Economics, said that for the global economy, a sustained rise in oil prices would add upward pressure to inflation.

“If crude oil prices were to rise to $100 per barrel and remain at those levels for a while, that could add 0.6-0.7 percent to global inflation,” he said, noting that this would also lead to an increase in natural gas prices.

“This could slow the pace of monetary easing by major central banks, particularly in emerging markets, where policymakers tend to be more sensitive to swings in commodity prices,” he added.

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